

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

(172)

55-M

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Action
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RMR

FROM: Moscow

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1084, October 25, 7 p.m.

I took advantage of official call on [] today express in strong terms our belief Soviet media not correctly informing Soviet people of facts in current Cuba crisis.

I said one of principles underlying US practice of diplomacy is that communications must be maintained between US and Soviet Union. I said President, who is firm believer in basic importance communications with Soviet Union, stated our position on Soviet military assistance to Cuba in September statements. I recalled further in this regard Tass statement of September 11 about defensive nature Soviet arms assistance and Gromyko interview with President. I said either there had been breakdown in communications or else Soviets had chosen deliberately ignore limits of our position.

This elicited response, repeated several times in course conversation, that Soviet Union has no intention threaten US from Cuba or anywhere else.

I remarked that Soviet workers who are reported to be condemning President's speech in factory meetings and students who demonstrating in front Embassy could hardly know what they condemning since they have neither read it or heard it. I said Soviet jamming, which at high point, was most shocking thing I had found on my return to USSR. I inquired whether Soviet people had been informed on Stevenson UN speech or U Thant letter to Khrushchev.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

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-2- 1084, October 25, 7 p.m. from Moscow

speech because it was, as press accounts said, full of "crude anti-Soviet attacks". To question as to what these were, he replied those sections in which President said Tass statement and Gromyko had lied on nature Soviet missile build-up in Cuba. I said we believed they were false. In any case, this was precisely point I wished pursue, namely that Soviet public should be told what real nature our complaint is, even if at same time informed Soviet version.

[] twice said control situation on US side had passed into hands military. I vigorously denied (#)
[] said Soviet Union could not be talked to like Belgium or Luxembourg, and that Soviet ships would be defended if necessary. In general, however, he seemed to reflect genuine desire for conciliation.

When I asked him what he thought would happen now, [] said it was time for two sides to sit down together, put cards on table, state their positions and work out solution to problem. He referred in this regard to Khrushchev telegram to Bertrand Russell. He did not specify at what level or place he thought this should take place, and I offered no suggestions.

KOHLER

TRT

Note: Passed White House 10/25/62, 3:45 p.m.

(#) Omission, correction to follow.

NOTE: Advance copies to Mr. Owen (SOV) and SS-O CWO-M

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